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1. Historical Notes 
 
1.1 The Environment in which the TARP Auction 
was Conceived 
 
In early September of 2008, the adverse consequences of the subprime crisis 
spread and deepened at an alarming pace.1 On September 7, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, two cornerstones in the securitization of mortgages, were placed 
under conservatorship by their regulator (the Federal Housing Financial Agency). 
Half of the remaining U.S. investment banks ceased to exist on September 15, as 
Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America, while Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy protection. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the largest in U.S. 
history,2 set off what had been described as a devastating tidal wave that 
immediately sliced through the entire financial system.3 Two days later, the 
Federal Reserve loaned $85 billion to AIG. In spite of a record injection of $180 
billion in liquidity by central banks around the world, the situation became critical 
on September 18: interbank credit markets nearly collapsed, money market funds 
experienced an unprecedented run which was reported to exceed half a trillion 
dollars,4 while the commercial paper market was on verge of dislocation 
                                                 
1 For an inside view of the events that led to the creation of the TARP, see the account by former 
Assistant Treasury Secretary Philipp Swagel (2009). 
2 “Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt,” Marketwatch, Sept 15, 2008 
(http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/story.aspx?guid={2FE5AC05-597A-4E71-A2D5-
9B9FCC290520}&siteid=rss). 
3 “President Obama Goes to Wall Street,” Nightly Business Report, PBS, Sept 14, 2009 
(pbs.org/nbr/site/onair/transcripts/president_obama_sends_a_message_to_wall_street_090914). 
4 Congressman Paul Kanjorski, Capital Market Subcommittee Chair, C-Span interview on Jan 27, 
2009. (http://www.cspan.org/Watch/Media/2009/01/27/HP/A/14757/Rep+Paul+Kanjorski+DPA+ 
Chairman +of+the+Capitol+Markets+Subcmte.aspx). 
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010).5 At this point, some observers felt that the 
financial system was on the edge of a precipice and could completely melt down 
in a matter of days.6 
 
On the evening of September 18, then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke met with members of Congress. The 
atmosphere in the meeting has been described as grave and somber.7 Secretary 
Paulson presented a plan aimed at creating a “firewall” to stop the crisis from 
spreading from the weakest financial institution to the next. Instead of acting on a 
case-by-case basis, the plan called for a bold, comprehensive approach to attack 
what was perceived to be the root of the crisis.8 More specifically, Secretary 
Paulson proposed to purchase $700 billion in mortgage related securities that 
were believed to clog the overall flow of credit to financial institutions, 
corporations, and consumers. The rationale was that the virtual collapse of the 
market for mortgage related securities had made it extremely difficult to value 
these securities, and by extension, the financial institutions that owned them. This 
increased uncertainty was perceived to be the main reason behind the reluctance 
of market participants to loan and trade with one another. The hope was that 
removing these illiquid assets from banks’ balance sheets would restore 
confidence and jumpstart financial markets.9 
 
On September 20, the Treasury submitted a three page draft proposal which, after 
being substantially amended, was rejected in the House of Representatives on 
September 29.10 The Dow Jones Industrial Average immediately lost $1.2 trillion 
in market value (1.7 times more than the TARP bill), or 777 points (the largest 
single-day point drop in its history).11 Congress then further amended the bill, 
which swelled to more than 400 pages and $850 billion. When the Emergency 
                                                 
5 Commercial paper is used by corporations to meet short term funding needs to finance (e.g.) 
payroll or rent. For a reference see “As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action,” NY Times, 
October 2, 2008 (http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02crisis.html). 
6 See e.g. Paul Krugman’s PBS interview on January 17, 2009 (http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/ meltdown/interviews/krugman.html). 
7 Chairman Bernanke was reported as saying to a member of Congress: “If we don't do this, we 
may not have an economy on Monday” (“As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action,” NY 
Times, Oct 2, 2008). Senator C. Dodd, the chairman of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee remarked: “We are literally maybe days away from a complete meltdown of our 
financial system”. Senator C. Schumer recounted: “When you listened to him describe it, you 
gulped.” See “Congressional Leaders Stunned by Warnings,” NY Times, Sept 20, 2008, 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/washington/19cnd-cong.html). 
8 Testimony by Secretary H. Paulson before the Senate Banking Committee on Turmoil in U.S. 
Credit Markets: “Recent Actions regarding Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks 
and other Financial Institutions,” Sept 23, 2008 (www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1153.htm). 
9 Statement by Secretary H. Paulson, Sept 19, 2008 (www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1149.htm). 
10 The initial proposal may be found here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/ 
21draftcnd.html, and various drafts of the bill may be found here: http://www.govtrack.us/ 
special/econstimbill/changes.xpd.  
11 “U.S. House Rejects $700 Billion Financial-Rescue Plan,” Bloomberg, September 29, 2008 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeqvQcX6sRe4). 
Economic Stabilization Act was finally signed into law on October 3,12 however, 
it was unclear how the mortgage related securities would be acquired from banks 
and at what price. For MBS, a reverse (“low bids win”) auction had been 
mentioned (e.g. in the September 29 bill), as it was perceived to be an efficient 
and transparent mechanism for determining prices when markets are not 
functioning. Such an approach had been successfully adopted in the late 1980’s 
during the “Saving and Loans Crisis” to purchase distressed real estate.13 As 
many noted, however, MBS are complex securities that are different from real 
estate, and doubts were immediately expressed about the effectiveness of such a 
straightforward reverse auction in the current context.14 Since there was no ready-
to-use procedure that would fit the Treasury’s needs, a new type of auction 
needed to be designed without delay.  
 
On Saturday, September 20, a team at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
proposed to the Treasury a basic structure for government purchases of large 
numbers of MBS through a procurement auction based on reference prices 
(Armantier and Vickery 2008). In the week that followed, the Treasury also 
contacted academics with experience in designing auctions from the ground up. 
These experts were grouped into four teams that developed separate proposals. 
The Treasury selected a reference price design submitted by Jacob Goeree and 
Charles Holt (2008b), and decided to associate them with Charlie Plott to refine 
their design and incorporate elements he had suggested.15 
 
Although it did not have what economists would characterize as a well defined 
objective function, the Treasury had specific priorities and concerns when 
designing the new TARP auction. Starting from the first draft submitted to 
Congress on September 29, the TARP bill stated that the objectives of the 
purchase program were i) stabilizing financial markets, and ii) protecting the 
taxpayer. So, although the primary objective was first and foremost to remove the 
illiquid MBS from the banks’ balance sheets, the Treasury also realized it needed 
to strike a delicate balance between overpaying for the securities (which would 
harm taxpayers) and underpaying (which would harm financial institutions).16 The 
goal was therefore to design an auction yielding a price between what was 
described as the “fire sale price,” at which some of these assets were traded at the 
                                                 
12 The bill may be found here: http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/109hr3997ai.pdf. 
13 “Lesson from savings and loans rescue”, Financial Times, September 24, 2008. 
14 See e.g. Varian (2008), Brusco (2008), or Ausubel and Cramton (2008). 
15 Decisions about the selection of the auction design were made entirely by the Treasury. 
Employees from the Federal Reserve only acted in an advisory capacity. Jacob Goeree, Charles 
Holt and Charlie Plott were put under contract by the Bank of New York Mellon (the auction 
custodian hired by the Treasury) to provide advice regarding the design and the implementation of 
the Reference Price auction. 
16 Observe that, because of the marked-to-market accounting practices in the U.S., underpayments 
by the Treasury would have hurt not only the banks that sold a given security, but also the banks 
that still owned shares of that security, as they most likely would have had to mark down the value 
of the security in their books. Given the fragility of the entire financial system at the time, such 
write-downs could have had severe consequences (see Swagel 2009). Thus, underpayment could 
involve a type of “externality” with an industry wide, negative impact. 
time, and the “hold to maturity price” which reflects the stream of mortgage 
revenues a patient investor would receive at maturity.17 Additional objectives 
were also considered, e.g., price discovery and provision of bank liquidity. 
Although recognized as important and considered when designing the auction, 
these additional objectives were not deemed to be first-order priorities.18  
 
 
1.2 The Design of the TARP Auction 
 
The design of an auction to purchase MBS as part of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (or TARP) presented a number of challenges, including: 
 
1. Dimensionality: The universe of possible MBS eligible for purchase by 
the Treasury was extremely large. In particular, within the realm of 
residential MBS alone, there were more than 23,000 distinct securities. 
Likewise, the auction had to be designed to accommodate a large number 
of bidders (possibly in the hundreds). 
2. Heterogeneity: MBS are highly heterogeneous as they can differ along 
several observed and unobserved dimensions, including their ratings, the 
vintages of the underlying mortgages, the locations and/or the amounts of 
the mortgages, the characteristics of the borrowers (e.g. credit ratings), the 
mortgage delinquency rates, and the originators of the loans. The ratings 
assigned by credit agencies to MBS were supposed to capture these 
differences, but many observers at that point in time believed that the 
ratings had ceased to reflect the securities’ actual risks and values.19  
3. Valuation: At the time the auction was designed, there was virtually no 
market for most MBS that the Treasury was considering for purchase, and 
hence no price information. Moreover, the unprecedented rate of 
commercial and residential foreclosures over the preceding year made it 
hazardous to rely on standard simulation models to value these 
securities.20 
4. Informational Asymmetry: Security owners could be assumed to have 
access to better information about the underlying MBS values than outside 
analysts and prospective buyers (e.g., by observing repayment streams and 
borrower default rates).  
                                                 
17 See B. Bernanke Sept 23, 2008 testimony to the Senate Banking Committee 
(http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=7a41ae
9e-30b2-4d7f-8f1b-4ef2e8ae28f7). 
18 There was considerable doubt about the ability of an auction to reveal meaningful price 
information. In particular, with the $700 billion purchase budget being contemplated at that time, 
the Treasury was likely to substantially shift the demand function for these assets. 
19 See e.g. “Triple A Failure,” New York Times, April 27, 2008, 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/ magazine/27Credit-t.html). 
20 See e.g. “Paulson Seeks Mortgage Value That Eluded Bear, Lehman,” Bloomberg, Sept 24, 
2008 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aGT_xTYzbbQE). 
5. Concentration of Ownership: A single financial institution could own 
most shares of a specific security, thereby creating a thin market problem. 
Although the extent of the problem was unknown, it was believed to apply 
to many of the securities under consideration (Swagel 2009).  
6. Time Constraints: The time constraints were threefold. First, as the 
Treasury initially considered conducting the first auction within a matter 
of weeks, the auction had to be designed, tested, and explained to bidders 
under considerable time pressure. In addition, a platform to submit bids 
and to effectively settle the winning tenders had to be developed 
immediately. Second, for any given auction, the bidding process needed to 
be completed in a short time frame so as to avoid outside influence and 
possible sellers’ regret.21 Third, once initiated, the program needed to have 
a significant and immediate impact to restore market confidence. 
 
The Treasury realized that it might not be able to fully address all of these 
challenges. In particular, it understood that in the presence of asymmetric 
information, it is often difficult to avoid inefficiencies (Swagel 2009). The goal 
then became to rapidly design a simple yet robust auction that would effectively 
mitigate possible adverse consequences.22  
 
Two simple auction formats were quickly abandoned. The first was a “Grand 
Auction,” whereby different securities would be pooled together in a single 
procurement (reverse) auction and purchased at a single price, irrespective of the 
type of security accepted. A perceived advantage of this approach was that it 
could promote competition by letting owners of different securities compete 
against each other in a single auction. However, as illustrated in Section II of the 
paper, theory suggests that adverse selection could be severe in such a simple, 
simultaneous, multi-object auction.  
 
The second format to be ruled out was a security-by-security auction. This 
approach would effectively deal with the unobserved value heterogeneity, as a 
separate auction would be conducted for each of the thousands of securities. 
Because of the problems of dimensionality, ownership concentration, and time 
constraints, however, this approach was considered not only impractical but also 
undesirable. 
 
Multi-round auctions were also discussed in the press at the time the TARP 
auction was conceived (Ausubel and Cramton 2008). For example, a reverse 
“clock auction” was suggested whereby bidders indicate quantities they wish to 
sell at current clock prices, which would be reduced sequentially until requested 
                                                 
21 Given the high market volatility at the time, it was feared that bidding could be influenced by 
sudden market developments if the bidding process was to last for more than a few minutes. 
Conversely, concerns were expressed about the possibility that financial markets could be affected 
or manipulated during the auction process. 
22 The economic environment that led to the TARP auction and the process of designing and 
implementing the auction are described in detail in the Supplemental Materials. 
sales no longer exceeded a government purchase budget. A potential problem 
with clock auctions was the time required to complete a single auction, given the 
need to run many auctions per day with up to 100 securities in each auction. It 
was also feared that, given the high market volatility at the time, bidding could be 
influenced by sudden market developments if the bidding process was to last for 
more than a few minutes. Conversely, concerns were expressed about the 
possibility that financial markets could be affected during the auction process. 
 
The Treasury decided to implement a uniform price format for the TARP auction, 
whereby owners of the same security would all receive the same price for each 
unit they sell to the Treasury. Three arguments were mentioned in support of this 
design choice: i) it may provide some protection against the winner’s curse (the 
bidders with the lowest bids are less likely to be penalized since they should 
receive a price exceeding their bids), ii) it may encourage participation from 
smaller or less informed bidders (who know that making a mistake may not be too 
costly since they are unlikely to set the market clearing price), and iii) it would 
generate a single market clearing price for each security, which might help with 
price discovery. The main argument in favor of the uniform price auction, 
however, was familiarity, as most financial institutions were experienced bidders 
under this format through Treasury auctions or the recently implemented “Term 
Auction Facility.” 
 
We now describe the basic features of the auction design the Treasury selected, 
and how it might have been implemented.23 A series of 20 to 30 different auctions 
was expected to be conducted, each at a different date. A few days before a given 
auction, Treasury officials would ask eligible bidders to indicate how many shares 
of each of a pre-announced set of (say 1,000) securities they would be willing to 
sell.24 For each security, a bidder would not be allowed to submit a bid to sell a 
quantity that exceeded what was listed in this “nomination” phase. In addition, the 
Treasury was considering asking participating bidders not to buy or sell any of the 
securities they listed during the interval between the nomination phase and the 
completion of the auction. The Treasury would select a subset of securities (e.g., 
500) to be included in this particular auction, and it would decide on a total 
purchase budget. These decisions would be based in part on information obtained 
from the nomination process. For instance, the Treasury could decide not to 
purchase more than 50% of the face value of the assets nominated. 
 
For the securities to be included in an auction the Treasury would have set 
reference prices combining the latest transactions data, other market information 
(e.g. Markit ABX index, the subprime residential MBS credit derivative), 
                                                 
23 This section borrows heavily from Armantier, Asker and Vickery  (2008). 
24 Eligibility restrictions (i.e. which institutions would be allowed to bid) were not handled by the 
team in charge of designing the auction. Likewise, the legislation required that firms selling assets 
through TARP should provide warrants to the government. The Treasury team was not asked to 
design an auction that would include warrants. The auction eligibility and the warrant issues are 
therefore not discussed here. 
valuation models, expert opinions, and prices from previous TARP auctions. The 
Treasury team was aware that estimating relative values of MBS could not be 
done with perfect accuracy. This task, however, was arguably easier than 
estimating absolute values of MBS. In particular, some argued that MBS had been 
hit by a common unobserved macroeconomic shock. As a result, although the 
absolute values of MBS became highly uncertain, their relative values were 
believed to have remained relatively unchanged. 
 
This basic reference price design, however, had not been tested, and it was not 
clear how it would perform. In such situations, it is becoming increasingly 
common to use laboratory experiments to test and refine the design of specific 
auction procedures.25 We began the process of setting up experiments in mid-
October of 2008, just weeks before the design consultants were told to “take a 
vacation” (which presumably meant that the auction was on hold, although an 
official announcement was not ready at that time). On November 12, the Treasury 
officially announced that it had abandoned its plan for the TARP auction. Instead, 
it decided to use the funds allocated by Congress to take an equity position in 
several banks. Secretary Paulson explained that the situation had changed and that 
capital injections were now a more effective approach to address the situation 
faced by the financial system.26 
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2. Robustness Checks 
 
We conducted two additional sets of experiments to assess the robustness of our 
results. The general objective is to verify that the ranking of the four auction 
formats in terms of purchase efficiency ratios does not change when we modify 
some features of the design. 
 
The first robustness check experiment is concerned with the fact that, in the 
baseline design presented in Section III, subjects earn nothing when their bids are 
not accepted. Although, this feature is common to a number of auction 
experiments (see e.g. Kagel and Levin 2008) and may be rationalized in the 
context of the TARP auctions (the banks owned the toxic assets prior to the 
auctions and would not modify their books unless they sell to the government), it 
may also affect behavior. In particular, paying nothing on shares not sold may 
provide subjects with an incentive to bid aggressively in order to improve their 
chances of selling their shares to the government and thereby earn money. On the 
other hand, because of loss aversion, it may lead subjects to bid conservatively in 
order to avoid losses. In other words, paying nothing for the shares not sold at the 
auction could affect behavior, although the direction of the effect is difficult to 
predict. 
 
To evaluate the possible effect of the earnings frame we modify the payment 
function in the baseline design. For each bid accepted, the bidder now receives the 
price produced by the auction. Otherwise, the bidder earns the true value of the 
asset. Whether or not a bid is accepted, earnings are normalized by subtracting 
(Signali,s – 10), where Signali,s is the signal received by subject i about the true 
value of security s. To summarize, for each share of security s sold to the 
government bidder i earns Ps – (Signali,s – 10) where Ps is the price of security s at 
the auction, and for each share of security s not sold at the auction bidder i earns 
Vs – (Signali,s – 10) where Vs is the true value of security s revealed after the 
auction. Observe that the normalizing factor (Signali,s – 10) is the lower bond of 
the support of the true value conditional on the subject’s signal. As a result, a 
bidder is guaranteed to earn between $0 and $20 per rejected bid, and losses are 
not possible unless the bid is below the lower bond (Signali,s – 10). Note also that 
the normalization process is such that a bidder’s expected revenue is ex ante the 
same for a high value asset and for a low value asset. Finally, note that the other 
features of the design, including the random draws for the signals and the security 
values, are identical to the baseline experiment. Therefore, the results can be 
compared directly across the two sets of experiments. 
 
The outcomes of the first robustness check experiment for the four treatments 
(with 6 sessions each) are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 6. Although not 
statistically significant at the 5% level, two differences with the baseline 
experiment seem to emerge. First, the average purchase efficiency (value to 
expenditure ratio) is slightly higher in each treatment of the robustness check 
experiment (compare the 3rd column in Tables 4 and 6). This therefore suggests 
that providing subjects with a positive payoff when they do not sell a share leads 
them to bid more aggressively (lower). Second, as indicated in Figure 3, there 
appears to be some learning as the purchase efficiency ratios decline over the first 
three auctions.  
  
Despite these slight differences, the robustness check experiment confirms the 
general conclusions reported in section IV: i) with an average efficiency ratio of 
0.975, the Reference Price auction is almost perfectly efficient when the 
government possesses accurate information, ii) the two noisy reference price 
treatments produce lower efficiencies and cannot be distinguished statistically, 
and iii) the Grand Auction is systematically less efficient than the Reference Price 
auctions, even when the government has very noisy information about the value 
of the securities.  
 
The second robustness check experiment we conducted is concerned with the 
asymmetry in the baseline design between the information available to bidders 
through their signals and the information provided by the government through the 
reference prices. Indeed, a subject receives a signal about the absolute value of a 
security, while, when announced before the auction, the reference price provides 
information about the relative value of the security. This asymmetry in 
information may be difficult to process, which could explain why in the baseline 
experiment subjects are not able to better exploit the errors made by the 
government when it announces noisy reference prices. 
 
To test this hypothesis we modify the way reference prices are calculated by 
having the government estimate the absolute (rather than relative) value of the 
corresponding security.  In other words, the government sets the reference price of 
a security equal to the signal it receives about the true value of this security. 
Recall that in the two noisy reference price treatments, the government’s signals 
can take any integer value in a range from $20.00 below the true value to $20.00 
above the true value, and is therefore twice as noisy as the bidders’ signals. 
Although the reference prices are different than in the baseline experiment, the 
allocation and payment mechanisms remain identical in the second robustness 
check experiment. In particular, submitted bids are still divided by the 
corresponding reference price, and the lowest normalized bids are still accepted 
first. Finally, observe that compared to the baseline experiment, the reference 
prices are not only easier to process for the subjects, but also, they can be much 
more informative. In some cases for instance, they can even reveal the true value 
of a security to a bidder (e.g. a bidder receiving a signal of $30 and observing a 
reference price of $60 should infer that the true value of the security is $40). 
 
We only conducted the two noisy reference price treatments (6 sessions each) for 
the second robustness check experiment. Indeed, the Grand Auction is not 
affected by the change in reference prices, and running the accurate reference 
price treatment would mean revealing the true value of the assets to the bidders. 
The results reported in Table 7 and Figure 4 confirm once again that the 
Reference Price auction performs better than the Grand auction even when the 
government has imprecise estimates of the reference prices. In addition, as 
indicated in Figure 4, the noisy reference price treatment produces slightly higher 
average efficiency ratio (0.894 versus 0.847) when the reference prices are 
announced instead of kept secret. As indicated in the last column of Table 7, 
however, the difference between the two treatments is not significant at the 10% 
significance level. In other words, consistent with the results reported in Section 
V, subjects are not able to exploit the government mistakes, even when the 
announced reference prices are expressed in terms of absolute rather than relative 
values. 
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Table 6. Alternative Earnings Robustness Check: Purchase Efficiency  
Value purchased to expenditure ratios averaged over all 8 auctions per session 
 
Treatment: 
Reference Prices 
Session Purchase Efficiency 
Averages for Seeds 1 to 6 
Treatment 
Average 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-Rank Test* 
None (unitary) .79, .76, .82, .80, .83, .91 .819   
Announced, Accurate .88, 1.00, 1.03, .95, 1.02, .96 .975 Z = –1.794 P value = 0.047 
Announced, Noisy .82, .88, .90, .94, .97, .83  .890 Z = –2.201 P value = 0.028 
Secret, Noisy .99, .85, .87, .83, .90, .85  .899 Z = 0.000 P value = 1.000 
* Each test compares the distribution of the 6 ratios in the corresponding row with the distribution in the row 
above. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Absolute Reference Price Robustness Check: Purchase Efficiency  
Value purchased to expenditure ratios averaged over all 8 auctions per session 
Treatment: 
Reference Prices 
Session Purchase Efficiency 
Averages for Seeds 1 to6 
Treatment 
Average 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-Rank Test* 
None (unitary) .79, .81, .79, .77, .72, .74 .766   
Announced, Noisy .89, .93, .87, .88, .99, .82  .894 Z = –2.201 P value = 0.028 
Secret, Noisy .81, .82, .91, .82, .89, .84  .847 Z = -1.572 P value = 0.116 
* Each test compares the distribution of the 6 ratios in the corresponding row with the distribution in the row 
above. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.  Alternative Earnings Robustness Check: Purchase Efficiency by 
Auction 
Purchase value to expenditure ratio averaged over the 6 sessions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Absolute Reference Price Robustness Check: Purchase Efficiency 
by Auction  
Purchase value to expenditure ratio averaged over the 6 sessions 
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3 Experimental Instructions 
Instructions, Page 1 of 6 
 Securities: This is an auction in which you have the role of a bank with a 
portfolio of mortgage-backed assets, referred to as "securities." Owning 
different securities is like owning different stocks. Just as shares of stock 
in a given company are identical, units of a specific security are identical. 
These units will be referred to as "contracts." 
 Security Values: There are 6 different securities, labeled A ... F. Each 
security has an underlying value that is the same for all bidders, but no 
bidder knows prior to the auction what this common value will turn out to 
be. You have the opportunity to sell some of your contracts to the 
government, but you will incur a loss if you sell contracts at prices that are 
below their values, which will be revealed after the auction. 
 Value Estimates: For each security you own, you will receive a signal 
that is an imperfect estimate of the value of that security. Different bidders 
receive different signals about the value of the same security. Some 
bidders' signals may be above that security's true value, and some may be 
below. The average of all possible signal draws is equal to the underlying 
common value of the security (details to follow). 
 Purchase Budget for Combined Auction: The government has budgeted 
a fixed amount, $2000, to purchase contracts for the 6 securities to be 
included in the auction. This budget will typically limit the number of 
contracts that can be purchased. 
 Reverse Auction: This a "reverse auction" in which the government 
prefers to purchase from low bidders. You will be given the chance to 
submit an offer to sell your contracts for each of the different securities 
that you own. You will be bidding against 5 other bidders in each 
auction. 
 
Instructions, Page 2 of 6 
 Reference Prices: Since securities are different assets, some are 
intrinsically more valuable than others. Many of these securities are not 
actively traded, and the government has hired financial experts to estimate 
their values. Prior to the auction, each security has been assigned an 
official "reference price" that will be used to compare bids for different 
securities. The reference price is an estimate of the value of the security 
relative to the first security (A). For instance, if the reference price for 
security B is 2, then it means that the government believes that security B 
is twice as valuable as security A. And securities with reference prices 
below 1 are deemed to be less valuable then A. By construction, the 
reference price for security A is 1. 
 Comparisons: The government is not necessarily interested in purchasing 
the securities with the lowest bid prices. Instead, the government is willing 
to pay more for securities that it believes to be more valuable. To compare 
bids across different securities, each bid submitted will be transformed 
into a normalized bid by dividing it by the reference price for that 
security. 
 Example: For example, suppose that the reference price for a security is 2. 
Then a bid of $24 on this valuable security is the same as a bid of $12 on 
security A (which always has a reference price of 1), since both bids result 
in the same normalized price: $24/2 = $12/1 = $12. 
 Purchase Decision: The government will accept bids with low 
normalized bid prices, moving to bids with higher and higher normalized 
bid prices until the fixed budget is exhausted or until all bids are accepted, 
whichever comes first. 
 Reserve Prices: The government also reserves the right to reject offers 
that it deems to be unacceptably high, i.e. the maximum payment is 
capped at $100 for each security. 
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 Cutoff Normalized Price: As just explained, offers with lower 
normalized bid prices will be accepted, and offers with high normalized 
bid prices will be rejected. The cutoff normalized price is the lowest 
normalized bid price among the rejected bids. This cutoff is like a market-
clearing price, and it determines the price paid for all of the bids that have 
been accepted. To summarize, bids with normalized bid prices below the 
cutoff are accepted, and those at or above the cutoff are rejected. 
 Uniform Sale Price: For a given security, the government will purchase 
all accepted contracts at the same price: Uniform Price = (cutoff 
normalized price)*(reference price) for each contract of that security. 
Note that the price paid for two different securities will differ, since the 
reference prices of the two securities will generally be different. 
 Example 1: Suppose that there is a bid price of 50 for a security with 
reference price of 2, and a bid price of 80 for a security with a reference 
price of 4. These bids have normalized prices of 50/2 = 25 and 80/4 = 20 
respectively, so the 80 bid (with the lower normalized price) is more likely 
to be accepted. If this is the only accepted bid, the normalized price of 25 
for the rejected bid of 50 is the cutoff normalized price. Thus contracts 
associated with the accepted bid of 80 would be sold for 25 times the 
reference price of 4 or for 100 per contract. 
 Earnings: The amount you receive for a sale is at least as high as your 
bid, since all accepted bids have normalized prices that are at or below the 
cutoff normalized price. If a bid is not accepted, you earn nothing for 
those contracts. If a bid is accepted, the difference between the sale price 
and the value of the security will be added to you earnings. Thus you will 
be penalized if you sell below value, and you will earn more to the extent 
that your sale is above value (revealed after the auction). 
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 Example 2: Suppose there are bids on 4 different securities, some with 
high prices and some low, but the normalized bids are ranked at 8, 9, 11, 
and 14. If the auction budget is such that only the bids with the two lowest 
normalized bid prices are accepted, then the cutoff normalized price for 
the first rejected bid is 11, and each of the two bids with low ratios result 
in sales for amounts that equal 11 times the relevant reference prices. If 
the accepted bids were 16 with reference price 2 and 9 with reference 
price 1, then the bid of 16 will result in a sale at 22 = (11)*(2), and the bid 
of 9 will result in a sale at 11 = (11)*(1).  
Bid Price Reference Price Normalized Bid Sale Price 
16 2 8 = 16/2 22 = (11)*(2) 
9 1 9 = 9/1 11 = (11)*(1) 
11 1 11 = 11/1 (no sale at cutoff) 
7 0.5 14 = 7/(.5)  (no sale) 
 Note: What you receive for an accepted bid is not affected by the bid 
price. But bidding too high can be risky since a high bid is less likely to be 
accepted. Conversely, if a low bid is accepted, you will receive an amount 
at least this high, but bidding too low can be risky since the amount 
received could be as low as what you bid. You incur a loss if you sell 
contracts below their values (revealed after the auction). 
 Earnings Example: If the true security values for the bids in the top two 
rows of the table turned out to be 20 and 10, then earnings would be $22 
(sale price) - $20 (value) = $2 for the bid in the top row and $11 (sale 
price) - $10 (value) = $1 for the bid in the second row. Earnings are 0 for 
bids that are not accepted (bottom two rows). But if the values for the 
securities in the top two rows were 24 and 12, then earnings for these bids 
would have been negative: $22 - $24 = -$2 and $11 - $12 = -$1. 
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 Values: The table below provides an example of your signal values and 
contract holdings for each of the 6 securities. The signal values are 
estimates and may turn out to differ from the actual values that are 
realized after the auction. 
 Value Range: All security values are between $0 and $100, so you can 
think of bidding in terms of "dollars per hundred of par value" and the 
contracts as being par value amounts. 
 Value Distributions: The value of any given security will be drawn 
randomly from a range between lower and upper bounds, with all values 
in that range being equally likely. For example, if the range is from 20 to 
80, then the value of the security may be 20, 21, ... 80, as if the value were 
determined by a hard spin of a roulette wheel with stops labeled for each 
possible value in this range. The upper and lower bounds for the security 
value ranges will be shown in a table that you can look at while selecting 
your bids. 
 Signal Values: Your signal for a given security is drawn randomly from a 
range between $10.00 below the true value to $10.00 above the true value. 
All signals in the interval are equally likely. The signals received by others 
about the value of a given security will be drawn randomly in the same 
manner. The range of possible signal draws for a more valuable security 
will be higher than the range for a less valuable security. 
 High or Low Signals: If you have a high signal value for a given security, 
it could be because your signal draw was high in the interval of possible 
signals, or it could be because the signal draws for all bidders are high 
relative to those of other less valuable securities. Conversely, all bidders' 
signal draws will tend to be low for a less valuable security. 
 Reference prices: For each security, the government receives a signal drawn 
from between $20 below the true value and $20 above the true value. The 
government then calculates the reference price by dividing its signal for each 
security by its signal for security A. For instance, if the government signals 
are 60 and 30 for securities A and B, then the reference prices are 1 (=60/60) 
for A and 0.5 (=30/60) for B. Note that a higher reference price will generally 
correspond to a more valuable security, but reference prices are subject to 
error since the government receives imperfect signals about security values.  
 
Security 
Code 
Reference Price
(per contract) 
Contracts
Owned 
Value
Signal
A $*.** ** $*.** 
B $*.** ** $*.** 
C $*.** ** $*.** 
D $*.** ** $*.** 
E $*.** ** $*.** 
F $*.** ** $*.** 
 
Summary Page 
 Bids specify the price at which you are offering to sell contracts of a 
specific security. 
 Different bids (offers to sell) may be submitted for different contracts of a 
given security. Each bid specifies the security and the bid price for a single 
contract. 
 In order to compare bids for different securities in a combined auction, all 
bids are divided by pre-announced reference prices and the resulting 
normalized bids for all securities are ranked together; those with low 
normalized bids are more likely to be accepted. 
 A fixed budget of $2,000.00 is used to purchase the securities to be 
accepted, beginning with the lowest normalized bids and working up 
sequentially until the budget is exhausted (with ties at the cutoff decided at 
random). 
 The cutoff normalized bid for the first rejected bid is used to determine 
the sale price for all bids with normalized bids below the cutoff. This 
cutoff normalized bid is the same for all securities. 
 Sale Price = (Cutoff Normalized Bid) * (Reference Price), so all 
successful bidders will receive the same amounts per contract of a given 
security, regardless of their actual bid amounts. 
 The sale price for an accepted bid is at least as high as the bid, since the 
normalized bid for an accepted bid will be at or below the cutoff 
normalized bid. 
 Earnings equal the difference between the revenues from contracts that 
are sold and their values (revealed after the auction). You earn nothing on 
contracts not sold. 
 Values for each security will be drawn randomly from a range that is 
between $20 and $80. 
 Signals for each security will be taken from a range that is within plus or 
minus $10.00 of its actual value. 
 For each security, the government receives a signal that is within plus or 
minus $20.00 of its true value. Dividing this signal by the government's 
signal for security A gives the reference price of the security. 
 There is only a single round of bidding in the auction. Bids may not be 
revised once submitted. 
 There will be 8 auctions, and your security values and signal value 
estimates will be randomly regenerated for each new auction. The 
program will keep track of your total earnings for all auctions. 
Special Earnings Announcement: Your cash earnings will be 5% of your total 
earnings at the end of the experiment. 
Table 8. Econometric Analysis  
Model with Significant Parameters Only 
 Panel 1: Price Bids1 Panel 2: Bid Acceptance2 Panel 3: Governments Losses3 
  Treat 1♠ Treat 2♠ Treat 3♠ Treat 4♠ Treat 1♠ Treat 2♠ Treat 3♠ Treat 4♠ Treat 1♠ Treat 2♠ Treat 3♠ Treat 4♠ 
1 Signal 0.921
*** 
(0.012) 
0.817*** 
(0.022) 
0.739*** 
(0.021) 
0.858*** 
(0.023) __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
2 Security Value __ __ __ __ -0.090
*** 
(0.010) __ __ 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.906*** 
(0.024) 
0.156*** 
(0.019) 
0.214*** 
(0.042) 
0.159*** 
(0.036) 
3 Signal Bias (i.e. Signal – Value) __ __ __ __ 
-0.080*** 
(0.015) 
-0.111*** 
(0.011) 
-0.063*** 
(0.008) 
-0.069*** 
(0.009) 
-0.077** 
(0.034) 
-0.128*** 
(0.033) 
-0.216*** 
(0.066) 
-0.230*** 
(0.054) 
4 Auction # 0.326
*** 
(0.074) 
0.430*** 
(0.097) 
0.179 
(0.145) 
-0.288*** 
(0.071) __ __ __ __ 
-0.279** 
(0.123) __ __ __ 
5 # of Contracts Owned 
-0.451* 
(0.273) __ __ __ 
0.239*** 
(0.057) 
0.144*** 
(0.042) 
0.142*** 
(0.039) 
0.162*** 
(0.027) __ 
0.144** 
(0.073) __ __ 
6 Bid # 3.467
*** 
(0.554) 
5.456*** 
(1.030) 
5.548*** 
(1.305) 
6.064*** 
(0.588) 
-0.303*** 
(0.034) 
-0.251*** 
(0.044) 
-0.186*** 
(0.024) 
-0.304*** 
(0.030) 
-0.116** 
(0.034) __ 
-0.191** 
(0.079) 
-0.233* 
(0.119) 
7 Bid #   *   # of Contracts Owned 
-0.310** 
(0.125) 
-0.561** 
(0.214) 
-0.569** 
(0.216) 
-0.663*** 
(0.121) __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
8 Reference Price __ 5.818
*** 
(0.529) 
2.345*** 
(0.534) __ __ __ __ __ __ 
-6.829*** 
(0.429) 
-4.232*** 
(0.762) __ 
9 “Overpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
1.688* 
(0.889) __ __ __ 
0.430* 
(0.208) 
1.233*** 
(0.218) __ __ 
-4.684*** 
(1.233) 
-2.792*** 
(1.523) 
10 “Underpriced” Reference Price† __ __ 
-6.290*** 
(1.796) __ __ __ 
-2.052*** 
(0.266) 
-3.013*** 
(0.264) __ __ 
32.479*** 
(3.300) 
31.806*** 
(3.448) 
11 Constant -2.191 (1.573) 
-7.341** 
(2.331) 
3.967 
(2.920) 
1.280 
(1.297) 
0.541*** 
(0.070) 
0.697** 
(0.271) 
0.515 
(0.178) 
0.600* 
(0.205) 
-39.276*** 
(1.442) 
-0.490 
(0.911) 
-9.883*** 
(1.869) 
-12.175*** 
(1.378) 
12 ߪ௎ 
5.215*** 
(0.426) 
6.237*** 
(0.689) 
7.341*** 
(1.112) 
6.645*** 
(0.713) 
0.588*** 
(0.079) 
0.575*** 
(0.075) 
0.516*** 
(0.081) 
0.434*** 
(0.052) 
2.147*** 
(0.080) 
1.197*** 
(0.157) 
2.823*** 
(0.208) 
1.856*** 
(0.324) 
13 ߪ௜ 
5.312*** 
(0.122) 
6.367*** 
(0.226) 
8.750*** 
(0.265) 
6.028*** 
(0.135) 
0.423*** 
(0.053) 
0.516*** 
(0.047) 
0.478*** 
(0.065) 
0.455*** 
(0.037) 
2.031*** 
(0.165) 
1.825*** 
(0.236) 
6.787*** 
(0.331) 
5.828*** 
(0.369) 
14 ߪ௧ 
4.053*** 
(0.139) 
3.848*** 
(0.188) 
4.731*** 
(0.200) 
3.864*** 
(0.128) 
0.238*** 
(0.051) 
0.188*** 
(0.036) 
0.214*** 
(0.048) 
0.282*** 
(0.050) 
1.578*** 
(0.209) 
1.320*** 
(0.176) 
1.837*** 
(0.240) 
1.917*** 
(0.236) 
15 ߪ௜,௧ 
1.337*** 
(0.428) 
1.851*** 
(0.320) 
3.824*** 
(0.650) 
2.700*** 
(0.867) __ __ __ __ 
0.892*** 
(0.279) 
0.828*** 
(0.273) 
1.159*** 
(0.283) 
0.960*** 
(0.339) 
16 Log Likelihood -8830.1 -11066.7 -11398.7 -9515.9 -881.9 -1493.0 -1562.8 -1401.7 -4590.2 -4492.9 -5571.7 -5419.1 
1 Panel Data Model where the Endogenous Variable is the Price Bid 
2 Panel Probit Model where the Endogenous Variable Equals 1 if Bid Is Accepted 
3 Panel Data Model where the Endogenous Variable is the Government Losses for each Security Purchased (i.e. Value - Price)  
♠ Treat 1=Grand Auction (No Reference Prices); Treat 2=Accurate Announced Reference Prices; Treat 3=Noisy Announced Reference Prices; Treat 4=Noisy Secret Reference Prices 
† For security S, Overpriced (Underpriced) is set equal to |A|*IA>0 ( |A|*IA<0), where A=Reference PriceS – ValueS / ValueA. 
The models are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. Standard errors are evaluated by bootstrap. ***, **, and * indicate significance at respectively the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
